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The year 1915 was a difficult one for the British Army. The Official Historian, Sir James 
Edmonds, lamented that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of 1915 consisted of ‘partly 
trained’ officers and men who suffered ‘awful slaughter and pitiably small results’ on the 
Western Front.
1
 This was demonstrated at the Battle of Loos, when the novice 21st and 24th 
Divisions were prematurely committed to action with disastrous consequences. Edmonds 
acknowledged the courage of these formations but was critical of their lack of field craft and 
felt that the exertions demanded of them were ‘small as compared with the original five 
divisions of professional soldiers of the B.E.F.’
2
   
 This contrast between the highly-trained, pre-war Regulars of 1914 and the 
inexperienced volunteers of 1915 is a common theme of Edmonds’ work.
3
 The official 
historian’s assessment that the BEF’s defeats in 1915 were due to its reliance on 
inexperienced volunteers has endured for more than a century. Edmonds furthered this view, 
writing in the second volume of the 1914 Official History that by end of that year ‘the old 
British Army [i.e. the Regular Army] was gone past recall, leaving but a remnant to carry on 
the training of the New Armies.’
4
 Whilst it was true that the pre-war Expeditionary Force was 
damaged beyond repair, Edmonds’s interpretation neglects the fact that there were sufficient 
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Regular battalions stationed around the British Empire to muster four new infantry divisions 
in 1915. This lack of coverage of Regular forces is compounded by the fact that the 
historiography of the British Army in 1915 is remarkably sparse despite, as Nick Lloyd has 
stated, it being ‘a year of real importance’.
5
  
Much of the historiography of 1915 remains rooted in the damning assessment provided by 
David Lloyd George’s controversial memoirs, where he raged against the ‘futile…criminal 
attacks’ which the British Army had undertaken.
6
 A generation later this theme was seized 
upon by Alan Clark in his notorious polemic The Donkeys which laid the blame for the 
disasters of the year at the feet of British generals and popularised the term ‘lions led by 
donkeys’. It is only in recent years that scholars have examined British performance in 1915 
in depth, with new assessments considering pivotal battles such as Loos and the problems of 
warfare in this period.
7
 This new scholarship has acknowledged the terrible cost of the year 
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but, rather than blaming this solely on the poor performance of senior officers, it has 
highlighted the complex problems of trench warfare which faced the British Army in 1915. 
However, the year remains understudied especially when compared to the volume of 
literature that examines the latter half of the war. 
 This article contributes to the under-developed historiography of the Regular Army in 
1915 through an analysis of one of these new formations: the almost entirely forgotten 28th 
Division. Although it would become the longest serving of Britain’s wartime divisions, it 
lacks a divisional history or any form of memorial.
8
 The division barely features in the France 
and Flanders volumes of the Official History. Edmonds discussed the fate of 21st and 24th 
Division in detail but neglected the simultaneous actions of 28th Division, dedicating just two 
uncritical pages to the week-long fight for the Hohenzollern Redoubt.
9
  The commanding 
officer of 28
th
 Division, Edward Bulfin, was clearly appreciative of this approach. When he 
was allowed the opportunity to review an early version of the work he told Edmonds “I have 
no comment to make on your draft chapters – you have let me off ‘easy’.” 10   
   Subsequent historians have shown little interest in the performance of 28th Division or the 
fight for the Redoubt. Authors examining the Battle of Loos have tended to focus on the great 
drama of its first forty-eight hours, with subsequent fighting largely ignored.11 Only Nick 
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Lloyd’s work Loos 1915 (2006) considers subsequent operations in depth. His work is the 
only one to offer any real consideration of 28
th
 Division’s bitter experience at the battle, and 
argues that the formation was unfairly singled out for criticism.
12
 
This essay will explore three main avenues of enquiry: the nature of the 28th Division and 
illustrate that a high standard of pre-war training could only go so far in the crucible of trench 
warfare.    ... the contention that its acknowledged high standard of training along pre-war 
lines was ineffective in dealing with the unfamiliar challenges of trench warfare. In addition 
to which   Many of the problems it encountered, particularly unrealistic orders and inadequate 
equipment, were as deleterious to the Regulars as they were to Territorial or New Army 
formations.
13
 Secondly, The fight for the Hohenzollern Redoubt will then be studied in detail 
with a focus on command, supply and equipment. Finally, the controversy that followed the 
end of the Battle of the Loos will be considered. The defeat of the 28th Division marked the 
nadir of the British Regulars. The division had entered the battle as an experienced and 
combat-hardened formation, but its commanders, equipment and tactics proved inadequate 
for the task. Following its defeat the BEF was forced to acknowledge that the Regulars could 
no longer be regarded as a distinct and elite component of the Army, as they were not 
significantly more successful than the Territorials or the New Armies. As will be 
demonstrated, even a crack Regular division with a high proportion of pre-war soldiers 
suffered from the same operational weaknesses in 1915 as the non-Regular and Imperial units 
of the BEF.  
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Genesis and Early Experience 
In early 1915 the British sector of the Western Front was almost entirely held by Regular and 
Indian Army forces. Although the core of the elite pre-war BEF had been lost amidst the 
maelstrom of the First Battle of Ypres (19 October – 22 November 1914), there remained a 
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significant contribution on the Western Front. The 7th Division, formed in this fashion in 
September 1914, had distinguished itself at the First Battle of Ypres and earned the nickname 
‘The Immortal Seventh’.
14
 In the winter of 1914-1915 more Regular battalions returned to the 
United Kingdom and were assembled into four new divisions; 8th, 27th, 28th and 29th. The 
first three were sent to the Western Front and the 29th Division was deployed to Gallipoli.   
The 28th Division experienced went through a troubled genesis in the winter of 1914-15. 
Although built from experienced infantry battalions, the division lacked a clear military 
identity. Its three infantry brigades, the 83rd, 84th and 85th, were new creations staffed by 
officers who had not worked together before. The division was commanded by Major-
General Edward Bulfin  who had served with distinction as a brigadier-general in the opening 
months of the war, earning the admiration of Sir Douglas Haig, who described him as a 
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‘tower of strength’.
15
 However, Bulfin had suffered a severe head wound in November 1914 
and he was still convalescing when given the opportunity to command 28th Division. 
Although a tough professional and a proven fighter, Bulfin’s contemporaries felt that he was 
‘not the man he was before he was wounded’.
16
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 The manpower of 28th Division appeared to be promising. A staff officer, Major 
Philip Howell, felt that the division was composed of ‘real good regular battalions from 
India.’
17
 In fact, this was not quite true, as the 1st Suffolk were garrisoned in the Sudan and 
1st Welch were stationed at Malta at the outbreak of war.
18
 Overseas battalions had the 
advantage of being kept at a higher peacetime strength than home battalions and had in 
peacetime held priority for receiving trained drafts. Indeed, this had been a matter of some 
consternation for their sister battalions in the United Kingdom, who were frequently forced to 
release their best men to serve as reinforcements for imperial garrisons. Yet, although 
individual soldiers were of a high standard, the quality of battalion training on station was 
uneven. Battalions in India experienced ‘a life of grinding inactivity, dominated by the 
climate’ and the Indian government was parsimonious when it came to funding military 
exercises.
19
 The 1st Suffolks in the Sudan found themselves preparing for a renewed war with 
the Mahdists, but as General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien cautioned, ‘one could never become 
an up-to-date soldier in the prehistoric warfare to be met with against the Dervishes’.
20
 
Despite their Regular status, it was clear that the battalions of 28th Division would need time 
to prepare themselves for the new challenges of the Western Front. Bulfin felt the division 
                                                          
17
 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (Hereafter LHCMA), Howell Papers, 
IV/C/3/113, Howell to his wife, 20 February 1915. 
18
 C.C.R Murphy, The History of the Suffolk Regiment, 1914-1927 (London: Hutchinson, 
1928), p. 17. 
19
 Edward Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1980) p. 218; 
George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to 
France and Belgium in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
pp. 48-50.   
20
 Horace Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty Eight Years’ Service, (London, J. Murray, 1925), 
p.67 
needed to train together for at least two months so that officers and men could come ‘to know 
the others' values and peculiarities’.
21
 
 Unfortunately, the urgent need for reinforcements in France meant that the division’s 
training time was curtailed, and it was rushed to France at the end of January 1915. The 
noisome environment of the Western Front took an immediate toll on the formation. Sickness 
rates surged as soldiers who had previously been stationed in tropical climates shivered in the 
winter weather.
22
 Lord Loch, the division’s chief of staff, estimated that 4,000 men had fallen 
ill in their first month at the front, with the majority suffering from trench foot.
23
 Worse still, 
the Germans opposite the division discerned that the formation was new and resolved to test 
its mettle. A German trench raid on 5 February 1915 surprised the 2nd East Yorkshires and 
captured the battalion’s two machine guns.
24
 The loss of the machine guns was especially 
humiliating as ‘Regimental machine guns, in 1915, were regarded almost as sacred. To lose 
them … was considered as shameful as losing the regimental colours.’
25
 Word of this 
embarrassment soon spread. Staff officer Captain Billy Congreve noted in his diary ‘I hear 
rumours that the 28th Division lost a trench last night’ adding that the division was composed 
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of ‘hurriedly put together Regular battalions, collected from all over the world, given staffs 
made up in the same way and thrown out here. A most rotten arrangement.’
26
   
 It was an inauspicious start for the division. Loch concluded ‘We were not much of a 
crowd to start with and we have been put into the most difficult place in the line and we have 
made a mess of it.’
27
 Within a month of arrival on the Western Front, concerns about the 
effectiveness of 28th Division prompted Field Marshal Sir John French to take the unusual 
step of temporarily detaching its original brigades and sending each of them to spend time 
with an established Regular division to acclimatize them to the realities of the Western 
Front.
28
 This decision was a humiliating one and Bulfin felt he deserved to be dismissed from 
command as a result.
29
 Edmonds, mindful of the reputation of the Regular Army, concealed 
the truth behind this embarrassing matter in the Official History, writing only that ‘the 
brigades of 28
th
 Division, depleted by sickness were relieved … as a temporary measure.’
30
 
 However, the policy proved successful and over the following month the brigades 
showed marked improvement. The previously critical Congreve noted in late March ‘We 
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have found the 85
th
 Brigade to be first class in every way.’
31
 When 28th Division reformed in 
early April it had overcome its early problems. The improvement in morale and organisation 
came not a moment too soon, as a few weeks later the division was caught up in the chaos of 
the Second Battle of Ypres (21 April – 25 May). The 28th Division put up determined 
resistance to stem the German attack, suffering the heaviest casualties of any British division 
engaged.
32
 The battle was its first major engagement and it emerged with its reputation 
enhanced, with Sir John French singling it out for praise.
33
   
The heavy losses suffered at Second Ypres have led to the suggestion that the division was 
‘inexperienced’ by the time it was deployed to the Hohenzollern Redoubt.
34
 However, a close 
study of the composition of the formation reveals that this assessment is inaccurate. Despite 
its casualties the division retained a significant core of pre-war Regulars amongst both 
officers and men.
35
 The presence of these older soldiers provided an experienced backbone 
                                                          
31
 Norman (ed.), p. 117 
32
 Edmonds, Official History 1915, Vol. I, p. 356. 28
th
 Division suffered 15,533 casualties. 
33
 Ibid., p. 264, Footnote 1. 
34
 Lloyd, Loos, p. 195. 
35
 A survey of Soldiers Died in the Great War (London: HMSO, 1922) reveals that, of the 
men of the 2
nd
 Cheshires who were killed at Loos, 22% were pre-war Regulars and 25% were 
1914 volunteers with at least nine months’ service. Several factors explain the survival of 
these old soldiers despite the apparently devastating losses at Second Ypres. The 28
th
 
Division listed over 6,000 men “missing” at Second Ypres. This figure is more than double 
that of any other division engaged and suggests a collapse of administration amidst the chaos 
of battle. It seems probable that a significant proportion of these men were separated from 
units in combat and subsequently returned. Further, many of those listed as “wounded” were 
chlorine gas casualties who generally made a full recovery. I am grateful to Dr Alison Hine 
for sharing these statistics.   
for the division as it rebuilt its strength by absorbing wartime recruits.
36
 Major C.J. Derverell 
of 85th Brigade commented that ‘officers and men are good keen lads, ready to fight.’
37
 The 
'experienced' status of the formation was confirmed in August, when it was given temporary 
command of several battalions from the recently-arrived 37th Division for the purpose of 
‘instructing them in trench warfare.’
38
 
 Nevertheless, the 28th Division was not without weaknesses. Bulfin was troubled by 
his old head wound and showed a tendency towards micro-management, much to the 
annoyance of his subordinates.
39
 The military standard of the division’s component brigades 
varied. In the estimation of its commander, Brigadier-General Cecil Pereira, his 85th Brigade 
was ‘far ahead of the others’.
 40
 The 83rd and 84th Brigades suffered from repeated changes 
of commanding officers. Some of these changes were caused by battlefield casualties, whilst 
others were a result of the expansion of the BEF and the need for experienced officers to take 
command of New Army formations. On the eve of the Battle of Loos, 84th Brigade lost its 
commanding officer Brigadier-General L.J. Bols, who was promoted to the staff of XII 
Corps.
41
 Although this appeared to be a promotion, Pereira felt that Bols had been 
‘degummed’ for inefficiency.
42
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 However, by mid-September 28th Division had recovered from its earlier trials and 
was recognised as a first-class Regular division. It was part of II Corps and when inspected 
by the corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson, in September he was 
‘delighted and most complimentary’, stating ‘that the bad news from Russia ceased to depress 
him when he saw such troops.’
43
 After its period of rest in the summer, the division was 
itching for action. Pereira felt that the ‘younger officers are for an assault on the Germans and 
the general spirit of the Brigade is for having a dash at something.’
44
 They were to get their 
wish at the Battle of Loos. 
The Battle of Loos 
The 28th Division began the battle in GHQ reserve. For reasons, which remain open to 
debate, Sir John French chose to keep his reserves far from the action and the division was 
held approximately 17 miles behind the front at the opening of the offensive.
45
 On 26 
September it advanced along congested roads and was ‘tired’ by the time it arrived at the 
front that evening.
46
 Fortunately the men ‘were by now comparatively old campaigners, and 
knew from past experience how to look after themselves while waiting to go into the line’, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Western Front. In September 1917, he became Edmund Allenby’s chief of staff in Palestine 
and served here for the remainder of the war.   
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thereby avoiding many of the problems experienced by the novice 21st and 24th Divisions 
during the same period.
47
   
 The 28th Division was placed at the disposal of Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert 
Gough’s I Corps which stood opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt and had been tasked with 
its capture.
48
 The Redoubt was the British name for a formidable defensive work that was 
thrust out approximately 500 yards in front of the main German position.
49
 It stood on 
elevated ground and possessed several defensive lines, each linked by a network of 
communications trenches. The entrenchments had been constructed to protect a sprawling 30-
foot high slag heap referred to as ‘The Dump’ and a fortified mining complex close behind it 
known as Fosse 8. The slag heap towered over the German lines and was studded with 
machine gun nests and artillery observation posts. Trench lines connected the Redoubt, the 
Dump and Fosse 8. The British identified each point individually, but the Germans 
considered it a single defensive position.  
[INSERT FIG 1:  Map of the Hohenzollern Redoubt at the outset of the Battle of Loos.   
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Caption:  On the first day the 9th Division was able to storm the entire position and 
advance as far as Pekin Alley to the north. By the time 28th Division joined the fray the 
Germans had retaken Fosse 8 and the fighting that followed took place in the trenches 
of the Redoubt and on the slopes of the Dump. 
 
The Dump and Fosse 8 gave the Germans a crucial observation advantage. They overlooked 
the British lines opposite the Redoubt and dominated the ground to the south. Haig noted 
‘Owing to Fosse No.8 commanding the ground to the south and southeast it is difficult to 
place guns for wire cutting of Enemy’s second line south of Hulluch without having them 
knocked out.’
50
 Yet, if the British could capture the position, then they would dominate the 
German lines in turn and gain a vital observation point for further attacks. The Redoubt, the 
Dump and Fosse 8 were of great tactical value to both sides.  
 At the opening of the battle, the 9th (Scottish) Division had stormed the Hohenzollern 
Redoubt and captured Fosse 8, but the success came at a high cost in lives and the division’s 
grip on its objectives was tenuous.
51
 By the time 28th Division arrived on the evening of 26 
September, the ‘situation around Fosse 8 was undoubtedly precarious’.
52
 The battle was 
entering its most critical phase and tensions were running high. Gough recalled that at a 
meeting on 27 September ‘Haig was visibly worried and, as is often the case under such 
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circumstances, he was sharp – perhaps I might say without injustice, cross: I also must have 
been very worried, and perhaps those below me thought the same of me’.
53
    
 For the battle to succeed it was important that Gough and Bulfin forged a working 
relationship. Several factors prevented this from occurring. The two men had no prior 
experience of working together and the 28th Division, never having previously served under I 
Corps, was not accustomed to its methods. The decision to deploy the reserve division in this 
sector was the result of battlefield necessity rather than considered forward planning. Worse 
still, there was mutual antipathy between the commanders.
54
 Gough recalled his first meeting 
with Bulfin: 
He was a bluff, red-faced man, and at once on entering the room commenced to 
explain that infantry were not cavalry - and it seemed to me that he was more intent 
on instructing me how to command a corps than he was to deal with the serious 




Bulfin was presumably protesting about the fatiguing march his division had undertaken, but 
this mitigating context was omitted in Gough’s account. For his part, Bulfin ‘could not get on 
with General Gough who accused the Division of being slow and who was always pressing 
for attacks without … sufficient artillery preparation.’
56
 Although 28th Division was 
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unfamiliar with the sector, Gough ordered an immediate attack. In this respect he appears to 
have forgotten his own experience commanding the 7th Division at the Battle of Festubert 
(15 – 25 May 1915) where he had been pressed into a hasty attack without time to 
reconnoitre the ground, noting then ‘It always seemed to me a very careless and casual way 
of conducting operations …[ it] threw a very unfair responsibility on subordinates.’
57
 After 
28th Division’s initial assault was repulsed Gough continued to hector the formation, even to 
the point of ignoring the chain of command and issuing orders directly to brigades.
58
 Captain 
Hugh Cumberbatch, Bulfin’s aide-de-camp, noted mid-way through the engagement: ‘I 
Corps very troublesome in their attentions and have either got wind up or don’t trust this 
Division.’
59
   
 Gough’s interference and the fraught situation at the Redoubt placed Bulfin under 
enormous pressure. Bulfin had been struck down by a fever three days before the Battle of 
Loos and it is unlikely that he had fully recovered by the time his division went into action.
60
 
Cumberbatch recorded that Bulfin ‘took a very decided attitude’ in his dealings with Gough 
but the strain extracted a toll. Bulfin was invalided home a week after the end of the battle 
and confided to Pereira that ‘his eyesight gave out’.
 61
 The engagement left psychological 
scars, for he later admitted to Edmonds that he ‘had a very confused memory of Loos – a sort 
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of horrid nightmare.’
62
 These pressures adversely affected his performance as divisional 
commander. Gough was predictably scathing in his estimation of Bulfin, complaining of 
‘slackness and a complete want of co-ordination and cohesion in the Division.’
63
 Yet some of 
Bulfin’s subordinates were also critical. Colonel Arthur Roberts, who assumed temporary 
command of the 85th Brigade early in the action, related that ‘I begged B. [Bulfin] to let me 
carry out the attack in my own way … I had already written the orders for it. But no, that 
word counterattack was sent down the telephone every ¼ hour – it is simply an excuse not to 
write orders I say.’
64
 Bulfin’s constant demand for hasty counterattacks probably reflected the 
pressure he was under from Hubert Gough. It is not clear why Bulfin objected to Roberts’s 
attack scheme, but he clearly failed to provide any useful alternatives. Command and control 
broke down further as the battle raged. A post-war regimental history complained that 
‘superior head-quarters entirely failed to realize the conditions in and around the Redoubt, 
and ordered attack after attack in a way that can only be described as ruthless and 
senseless.’
65
   
 There is no doubt that the sour relationship between Gough and Bulfin diminished the 
performance of 28th Division. Gough, under pressure from Haig to regain Fosse 8 as a 
precursor to operations further south, refused to countenance the idea of pausing and 
consolidating the position. Instead he pressed for repeated attacks. Although some of these 
assaults achieved local gains, none was strong enough to capture the entire Redoubt and 
many could only seize small portions of trench, which proved impossible to defend against 
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the inevitable German counterattacks. For example, a ‘gallant’ charge by the 1st Welch on 1 
October captured a sizeable portion of the enemy line but could not carry the entire trench, 
with the result that attackers were exposed to counterattacks from both flanks and forced to 
withdraw.
66
 Worse still, in his eagerness to retake Fosse 8, Gough failed to grasp that the 
growing weight of German counter-attacks threatened to evict the 28th Division from the 
Redoubt entirely. Unaware of this danger, Gough’s insistence on repeated, piecemeal attacks 
was disastrous. The policy exhausted the division and weakened its ability to withstand 
German ripostes.
67
 Bulfin seems to have had limited influence on the direction of operations 
and was forced to follow the detrimental orders of his corps commander.
68
  
 The initial deployment is worth recounting in detail so as to give an impression of the 
difficulties faced by the division as it deployed.
69
 Pereira's 85th Brigade slogged forward in 
pouring rain along communication trenches ‘filled with stragglers and wounded making 
movement very slow’.
70
 Its role was to relieve the bloodied 9th Division, which was still 
clinging to the Redoubt though it was unclear how much of the position it retained.
71
 To add 
to the confusion, the commanding officer of the 9th Division, Major-General George 
Thesiger, had been killed by a German shell on 26 September and Bulfin had been given 
temporary command of the formation thereby adding to his difficulties. Communication 
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beyond the British line was dependent on runners and establishing the boundaries of units and 
their approximate locations was largely guesswork. Worse still, Pereira initially possessed 
only a single map and two guides to steer his brigade into position. Roberts complained that 
‘the map [was] very inaccurate with a great many trenches not shown’ and later recalled ‘the 
whole situation of the Redoubt was hopeless confusion, men and officers shouting and doing 
nothing.’
72
 The state of affairs was so chaotic that Pereira was forced to prepare three 
separate sets of orders with each one dealing with a different scenario: ‘Original trenches 
captured and held for the most part, but very shakily’; ‘only British trenches held. Everything 
else lost.’; and ‘Hohenzollern Redoubt still in our hands.’.
73
 In the midst of this confusion it 
became clear that the Germans had retaken Fosse 8, prompting Gough to telephone Pereira at 
4.15pm ‘ordering an immediate counter attack across the open’.
74
 Pereira judged this 
‘impossible’ and believed ‘it was hopeless to do more than secure the Redoubt’.
75
 
Unfortunately, before more could be done, both Pereira and his Brigade Major, Captain J. 
Flower, were wounded.
76
 Arthur Roberts took charge of 85th Brigade but it was not until 
4.30am that his leading formation had taken position in the Redoubt.
77
 After consultation 
with his battalion commanders, Roberts asked for more time to consolidate the position: ‘This 
report was forwarded to 28
th
 Division. They replied the attack must take place at once with 
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 Pereira was wounded in the foot by shrapnel. Flower suffered a head wound and died some 
weeks later. 
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the utmost resolution, there must be no pause or delay until the FOSSE is taken.’
78
 Faced 
with a direct order, Roberts launched his assault at 9.30am on 28
 
September. After a brief 
artillery bombardment the 2nd East Kents (The Buffs) stormed the Dump but found the 
Germans were strongly entrenched around Fosse 8.
79
 Pressing the attack forward ‘was a 
hopeless task and those who attempted it were shot or grenaded.’
80
 As the attackers recoiled 
across the summit of the Dump they were ‘plastered with shells of all descriptions both from 
our guns and those of the enemy’.
81
 The attack was broken and the survivors fell back into 
the Redoubt. The charge was the high-water mark of 28th Division’s efforts.   
 The days that followed were characterised by a see-saw struggle for the Redoubt and 
‘extremely violent’ trench fighting.
82
 Each of 28th Division’s brigades rotated through the 
Redoubt but, despite repeated attempts to expel the Germans, nothing could change the 
course of the battle. German counterattacks steadily fought their way into the British position, 
culminating on 4 October when the last defenders were evicted and the Redoubt was finally 
lost.
83
   
 Several problems were encountered that explain the defeat of the division. 
Communications to the Redoubt were precarious; the only route being a single 
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communication trench, known as ‘Central Boyeau’.
84
 All traffic to and from the position used 
this trench. Bulfin described it as ‘very narrow and deep and most complicated to 
newcomers’ adding that it was ‘a funnel into which poured large numbers of wounded and 
leaderless men’.
85
 The communication trench was a prime target for German artillery fire and 
units moving through it ‘suffered many casualties’.
86
 A post-war regimental history 
bemoaned ‘the continuous blocking of these trenches by everlasting working-parties moving 
backwards and forwards’ which ‘caused such congestion and confusion that units sometimes 
abandoned the comparative security of the trench and took to the open, an uncertain and 
hazardous alternative in the prevailing conditions and in the darkness.’
87
 Attempts were made 
to reduce the dependence on the Central Boyeau by constructing parallel communication 
trenches, but the work was slow and poorly executed. Two working parties were stopped by 
enemy fire and a third only completed its new trench on the evening of 3 October, by which 
time it was too late to influence the fighting.
88
 Bulfin blamed his chief engineer, Lieutenant-
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 The dependence on the overcrowded Central Boyeau meant that traffic trickled 
forward at an agonisingly slow pace. Priority was given to reinforcements and supply parties 
moving towards the Redoubt and thus wounded soldiers often had to wait until nightfall 
before they could be evacuated.
90
 Despite this rudimentary traffic system it proved 
impossible to keep the soldiers in the Redoubt fully supplied. The intense fighting consumed 
ammunition, especially grenades, at a prodigious rate. The Buffs recorded that ‘the greatest 
difficulty was evinced in obtaining a sufficient supply of bombs.’
91
 At the height of the 
engagement the 1st Welch Regiment found that they ‘were cut off from supplies, food, water 
and worst of all bombs.’
92
 Herculean efforts were made to bring grenades to the front. Private 
Samuel Harvey of 1st York and Lancaster Regiment won the Victoria Cross for bringing 
thirty crates of grenades forward under fire before he was finally wounded. Yet individual 
heroism could not make up for the inadequacies of the Central Boyeau. 
 The tremendous appetite for grenades was due to the nature of the fighting in the 
Redoubt. Combat took place amidst a labyrinth of artillery-ravaged trenches, which were 
partially flooded and ‘full of dead’.
93
 Any movement above ground level drew immediate fire 
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 Crookenden, p. 56. 
and ‘it was impossible to show a head above the parapet.’
94
 Roberts remembered: ‘Once we 
got out on both sides and ran up and shot the Huns in the trench but M.Gs were on us within a 
minute and most [of us] were killed.’
95
 Edmonds felt that this was the first large scale, 
sustained ‘trench fight’ that the British Army had experienced on the Western Front.
96
 It was 
soon found that there was little opportunity for the Regulars to demonstrate the 
marksmanship or fire and movement tactics for which they were renowned.
97
 The grenade, 
not the rifle, was the dominant weapon and the engagement was characterised by ‘heavy 
bombing taking place at all points of contact with enemy’.
98
   
 The growing importance of the grenade had been noted throughout 1915 and by the 
time of the Battle of Loos approximately 20% of 28th Division’s infantry was classified as 
trained ‘bombers’.
99
 Yet the British bombers were greatly disadvantaged by their grenades, 
which were distinctly inferior to the German Model 24 Stielhandgranate.  The division was 
equipped with a mixture of the War Office-approved No.15 Ball grenade and the locally-
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manufactured Battye bomb.
100
 Both these grenades relied upon exposed fuses that the soldier 
had to ignite before throwing. Lighting a fuse amidst the chaos of battle was difficult and was 
complicated by the wet weather. Gough recalled of the Ball grenade: ‘the fuse of this could 
only be lit by striking it on a piece of emery paper and this was sewn on the man’s left sleeve’ 
but the rain meant ‘the emery paper was soaked and the bomb useless.’
101
 The 2nd East Kents 
found ‘owing to the rain the fuses were damp, matches gave out, and the only way to light the 
fuses was by means of keeping cigarettes alight.’
102
 It was estimated that 80% of Ball 
grenades failed to detonate in the damp conditions.
103
 The Battye bomb was no better. A 
contemporary remembered that to prime the grenade: 
… the bomber had to unwind a sticky tape, pull out a safety nail, and then (with the 
fingers of his left hand, fingers always clumsy and often cold and wet, and frequently 
nervous in addition) take the cardboard lighter, wobbling on the top of two inches of 




 The British bombers fought hard despite these disadvantages. Second Lieutenant 
A.J.T. Fleming-Sandes of the 2nd East Surrey Regiment won the Victoria Cross for hurling 
grenades ‘from the [top of the] parapet in full view, during a critical situation’.
105
 The 1st 
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Welch recalled protracted grenade fighting in the pre-dawn light where they ‘had the best of 
these battles, wounding and taking prisoners’ but the tide soon turned for ‘by 10am, the 
bombs were finished. The enemy’s supply were [sic] unlimited.’
106
 The greater weight and 
effectiveness of German grenades told. An officer of the 2nd East Kents commented ‘The 
organisation of the enemy bomb throwers was astounding. They threw at least 5 bombs to our 
one and of much more powerful description.’
107
 The 1st Northumberland Fusiliers 
experienced a ‘violent’ attack from German bombers, noting ‘the grenades, which were very 
large, were well thrown, came in a constant hail, breaking down all resistance and killing all 
before it.’
108
 By contrast, a German account recalled the ‘repeated but futile hand grenade 
attacks’ launched by the British.
109
 
 Although the battle was dominated by grenade fighting, both sides attempted to bring 
forward additional firepower to support their soldiers. The British were hampered by the need 
to use the congested Central Boyeau trench, which prevented the deployment of heavy 
Vickers machine guns. Several light Lewis machine guns were employed but they were still 
relative novelties at this stage of the war and the crews had only received ‘some elementary 
instruction’ in their use.
110
 The weapons jammed repeatedly in the muddy trenches and in 
several cases the gun teams were wiped out.
111
 In an attempt to provide further support, No. 9 
Trench Mortar Battery deployed four Vickers 1.57-inch mortars in and around the Redoubt. 
Unfortunately, within 24 hours of deployment two had been lost during a German counter-
attack, a third had been knocked out by counterbattery fire, and the fourth was forced to 
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withdraw due to ‘the difficulty of getting ammunition up into the Redoubt’.
112
 The loss of the 
trench mortars was keenly felt as the Royal Artillery could provide little fire support for the 
embattled 28th Division. At the beginning of the battle Gough made the unwise decision to 
withdraw 9th Division’s artillery, which had been registered around the Redoubt, and replace 
it with 28th Division’s guns ‘who knew nothing of the targets.’
113
 This transfer took several 
days to complete and greatly disrupted artillery fire support. The Royal Artillery lacked 
positions suitable for observation amidst the dreary plains, and the foul weather prevented the 
Royal Flying Corps carrying out reconnaissance flights. Furthermore, the point-blank nature 
of much of the fighting made it difficult for Forward Observation Officers to know exactly 
where the British line ended and the German line began.
114
 As a result the Royal Artillery 
was limited to shelling comparatively distant communication trenches.
115
 Attempts to deliver 
bombardments on German positions within the Redoubt were marred by poor co-ordination 
and friendly fire incidents.
116
   
 German forces did not suffer from these drawbacks. German machine guns could 
occupy elevated nests dug into the side of the Dump, and at Mad Point to the north and the 
Quarries to the south. These positions gave good fields of fire and allowed the weapons to 
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sweep the open ground between trenches of the Redoubt. Possession of the Dump gave 
German artillery observers a clear view of the British position and allowed their gunners to 
maintain accurate fire. This ‘stiff bombardment’ inflicted a steady stream of casualties and 
further degraded the ruined trenches.
117
 By 30 September it was reported that ‘Big Willie’ 
trench, which marked the outermost British-held line of the Redoubt, ‘has no existence 
except for a scratch of chalk.’
118
 The artillery fire was supplemented by German 
minenwerfers (trench mortars), which proved especially effective.
119
 An officer of the 1st 
Welch recalled that on 1 October ‘the enemy opened up with minenwerfer shell. The men 
were so congested it was not possible to get out of the way. When one lands in the trench 
men in the vicinity disappear.’
120
   
 These factors shaped the fighting in the Redoubt.
121
 In the maze of trenches it proved 
‘impossible to follow the progress of the battle or to ascertain the local situation.’
122
 
Improvised trench barricades made of sandbags, wood, barbed wire and battlefield debris 
became the focal point for bitter hand-to-hand combat. The Germans proved adept at 
breaching these obstacles. The history of the German 57th Regiment recalled: 
… barricades in both saps were cleared by blasting and the assault began: at the 
head of the advancing assault columns in each sap was a strong force of 
grenadiers/bombers, these followed by men carrying filled sandbags and who could 
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hurriedly build new barricades as required. Behind these, troops with rifles and 
grenades followed, mopping up dugouts and defending the parapets. At the rear, 
reserve troops to replace casualties among the grenadiers.
123
 
 An attack of this nature caught the 2nd Cheshires by surprise on 3 October, as their 
own history recorded: ‘The enemy broke through part of the trench occupied by the Welch on 
our left flank and advanced with great rapidity, throwing hundreds of bombs, their bombers 
being supported by machine guns and rifle men. The attack came as a complete surprise.’
124
 
Conversely, the British struggled to break through German barricades. The infantry lacked 
explosives with which to destroy them and it was difficult to target them with artillery. The 
inability to break through German trench blocks even prompted Brigadier-General T.H.F. 
Pearse to request that a mountain gun, a weapon considered obsolete on the Western Front, 
be brought forward to try and breach a particularly troublesome German barrier.
125
 
 On 4 October, after six days of ferocious fighting, the 28th Division was finally 
driven back to the old British front line. The Hohenzollern Redoubt had been lost. The battle 
had cost the formation 146 officers and 3,230 men, representing almost 30% of the division’s 
official infantry strength.
126
 The rate of officer attrition was particularly severe and reflected 
the close-range fighting. Of the first ten battalions to engage at the Redoubt, six lost their 
commanding officer. Four were killed in action and Lieutenant-Colonel White of the 1st 
Suffolk, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hoggan of the 1st Welch, were invalided home after the 
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battle. Neither returned to service. Roberts told Pereira that the two officers ‘went off their 
rocker’ and it is probable that they were psychiatric casualties who had reached the limit of 
their mental endurance.
127
 The Other Ranks suffered similar stresses. The Suffolk regimental 
history felt the battle was of a ‘most difficult, even disheartening, character’.
128
 The Cheshire 
regimental history took a stronger line, arguing that by the end of the fighting the ‘survivors 
had all but reached the limit of human endurance. This phrase is often used, but it is, 
unfortunately, justified.’
129
 German forces were also exhausted, but could take comfort in 
their victory. The 9th Bavarian Regiment recalled that the men suffered ‘from the cold, the 
rain and the lack of warm food’ adding ‘their uniforms were tattered, many of them were 
marching barefoot having lost their boots in the clinging mud. But good morale and certainty 





The defeat of the 28th Division was a bitter blow.  The I Corps had nothing to show for its 
efforts and the failure to capture Fosse 8 hampered efforts further to the south. Captain 
Cumberbatch noted that Gough was ‘very angry’ at the result of the battle.
131
 His rage was 
evident in a searing memorandum issued to 28th Division on 6 October, which listed twelve 
points of criticism. Amongst other complaints, Gough stated that the veterans of the 3rd 
Middlesex lacked ‘discipline and soldierly bearing’, felt that the retreat of the 2nd Cheshires 
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‘was disgraceful’ and condemned ‘lack of discipline among Brigadiers.’
132
 Ignoring his own 
role in the defeat, he concluded that there was ‘not sufficient energy in command … But it is 
not the business of the Corps to command Division – that is the business of the Division.’
133
 
In these comments he revealed many of the contradictions that were inherent to his command 
style. Gough desired initiative from his officers but wished to retain close control of the 
battle.
134
 He was critical of Bulfin’s orders that were ‘bad because they enter into details 
which should not find a place in Divisional Orders, and go into matters of tactical training’, 
yet expressed his anger at Brigadier-General Pearse for ‘shirking his responsibilities’ as he 
had allowed his battalion commanders too much tactical freedom.
135
  
 On the same day that he issued his condemnatory memorandum, Gough complained 
that the bloodied division was not working hard enough to improve its reserve trenches and 
felt that there was ‘no reason’ for such ‘weariness’.
136
 His report concluded ‘there is not a 
properly active and offensive spirit existing among Officers. The Commanding Officer is to 
be informed of this opinion of the GOC Corps.’
137
 It is perhaps little wonder that Pereira 
found the ‘injustice and crassness of [the] Corps Comdr’ was ‘beyond belief’.
138
 This period 
of criticism culminated on 11 October when, according to Captain Cumberbatch, ‘Corps 
commander came in before lunch to see General [Bulfin], the outcome of which is that the 
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General is to go home sick & have a rest.’
139
 Haig had doubts about this decision and 
‘pressed General Bulfin to remain with the Division but he declined.’
140
 Nevertheless, Haig 
still clearly rated Bulfin’s ability, for he was sent home to command a Territorial division 
rather than removed from command entirely.
141
 
 The 28th Division’s reputation lay in tatters. Haig felt that the formation ‘had not 
proved equal to the task.’
142
 Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney reflected Army gossip 
when he wrote that ‘28
th
 Division lost the Hohenzollern redoubt from being completely 
bombed out by six [battalions of] Germans, simply because Bulfin did not believe in 
bombing and the men were ignorant.’
143
 The surviving officers of 28th Division were 
painfully aware of the criticism. Pereira felt that ‘the whole of 28th Division [was] under a 
cloud’.
144
 Roberts agreed and told Pereira that ‘28
th
 Division simply stinks in the nostrils of 
First Army.’
145
 Despite the bleak mood, the formation resumed training on 8 October with a 
focus on lessons learned from the Hohenzollern Redoubt. As part of a staff exercise, the 
division drew up plans for a renewed effort to retake Fosse 8.
146
 Despite this useful study, no 
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one from the division was consulted prior to 46th (North Midland) Division’s disastrous 
assault against the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 13 October.
147
  
 There would be no further opportunity for the 28th Division to share its experiences. 
On 25 October the formation was ordered to embark for Salonika. Officially, the justification 
for sending the Regulars to this peripheral theatre was the need to provide ‘seasoned’ troops 
to strengthen the British contribution to the campaign.
148
 Yet given Sir John French’s 
opposition to sending any British soldiers to Salonika it seems curious that he would choose 
to send a battle-hardened Regular division.
149
 French’s own private papers do not clarify his 
reasoning. However, given that French had been unimpressed with the formation in early 
1915 and considering its recent defeat at Loos, it may be hypothesised that he was willing to 
let the division depart the Western Front in return for the fresh New Army formations which 
he had been promised by Lord Kitchener. The exact reasoning that underpinned the decision 
must remain a matter of conjecture. 
 The departure of the 28th Division, soon to be followed by its sister formation 27th 
Division, marked a low point for the Regulars of the BEF. One of the traditional strengths of 
the Regular Army was its ability to rely on its crack battalions to compensate for deficiencies 
in planning, for in Sir Michael Howard’s phrase, ‘Like well-trained horses, they can carry 
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even indifferent or incompetent riders.’
150
 Major-General Ivor Maxse put it another way in 
July 1916 when he remembered fondly that even when ‘hustled on and told to attack at an 
impossible hour … The Old Army could do these things and accomplish “the impossible.”’
151
 
But this reliance on the fighting ability of the Regulars could result in unrealistic demands 
being placed upon them, and Gough’s fury at the defeat of the division perhaps reflected his 
disappointment that they had failed to live up to the mythical standards of the pre-war Army.  
 In fact, 28th Division fought exceptionally hard and its endurance in the ‘nightmare’ 
of the Redoubt was testament to its tenacity.
152
 But without effective planning, preparation 
and suitable equipment, no formation of the BEF could fight its way through the German 
defences in 1915. The fact that the 21st and 24th Divisions of the New Army and the 
Territorial 46th Division were defeated when trying to tackle the same objective, was largely 
explained by reference to their inferior training compared to pre-war Regulars.
153
 Yet this 
explanation did not apply to the 28th Division and its defeat revealed many of the problems 
inherent to BEF operations in 1915. Regular divisions had been at the forefront of battle 
throughout 1915, but superior training and professionalism could not secure victory. As has 
been shown, the division’s core of pre-war soldiers meant it retained its Regular 
characteristics longer than the divisions that had been at the front since August 1914, but 
even with this advantage it could not overcome the many problems it faced.  
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 The 28th Division’s final engagement on the Western Front would be the last time 
that senior officers expected the Regulars to perform to the standards of the pre-war Army. 
Following the battle there was an acknowledgement that relentless casualties had eroded the 
force beyond repair. A pointed report issued after Loos stated: ‘it can no longer be assumed 
that measures which would as a matter of course have been taken in our Regular divisions in 
the earlier stages of the war, will now always be carried out efficiently.’
154
 This was formally 
acknowledged between late October and December 1915 when seven of the nine Regular 
divisions then serving on the Western Front were reorganised by exchanging a brigade with a 
New Army division.
155
 Officially, the purpose of this reorganisation was to ‘stiffen’ the 
inexperienced volunteers, but there is little evidence that it improved New Army combat 
performance.
156
 What is certain is that it permanently altered the composition of Regular 
divisions. This decision to break up almost all the long-standing Regular divisions was, in 
part, an acknowledgement that they had lost their original military identities. 
 In this respect, Edmonds’s assertion that the Battle of Ypres in 1914 witnessed the 
disappearance of the Regular Army may be qualified. The fighting at Ypres destroyed the 
homogenous pre-war British Expeditionary Force, which had been based in the United 
Kingdom, but it was the 28th Division’s defeat at Loos, and the loss of faith in the formation 
resulting in its subsequent transfer to Salonika, that marked the last act of the Regular 
divisions as a distinct component of the BEF on the Western Front.   
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 Division and Guards Division avoided this change. Both these divisions were 
unique: 1
st
 Division was the premier division of the British Army and Guards Division was 
composed entirely of Guards battalions.    
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